The special tribunal for Lebanon as political football

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019 
TAGS: KJUS, UNSC, PTER, PREL, SOCI, PINR, LE, SY 
SUBJECT: THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON AS POLITICAL 
FOOTBALL 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 500 
     B. BEIRUT 972 
     C. BEIRUT 1044 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is 
still a political football, with opposition-aligned figures 
striving to discredit it and the majority pledging its 
support for the STL's mission of bringing to justice those 
responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri.  In spite of the ongoing debate in Lebanon over 
the STL's neutrality, the tribunal's Beirut field office 
continues interviewing witnesses, including those aligned 
with Hizballah.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) With the STL's convocation in the Netherlands on March 
1, 2009, the process of bringing those responsible for Rafik 
Hariri's murder to justice shifted outside of Lebanon.  The 
impact of the STL process nonetheless remains a key factor in 
the calculations of Lebanese political players.  The accusing 
finger, previously pointed at Syria, shifted toward Hizballah 
with the May 23 publication of an article in Der Spiegel, 
which alleged that a Hizballah special unit carried out the 
assassination.  The article claimed that STL investigators 
relied on cellular telephone records, along with other 
techniques, to reach this conclusion.  The public airing of 
this accusation forced a re-framing of the debate over the 
STL inside Lebanon. 
 
OPPOSITION SEEKS TO DISCREDIT STL 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) The opposition's key strategy to confronting the STL 
has been to discredit it.  In its first official act on April 
29, the STL ordered the release of four former Lebanese 
generals -- held for nearly four years on suspicion of 
planning and/or implementing the assassination at Syria's 
behest -- after it determined that sufficient evidence did 
not exist to prosecute them.  The opposition attempted to use 
the release to its advantage in the June 7 elections by 
claiming that the unjust incarceration of the generals by the 
court showed that it is biased and politicized (ref A). 
 
4. (C) This charge was rolled out again on August 30 when one 
of the former detainees, former General Security chief 
General Jamil al-Sayyed, used the fourth anniversary of his 
arrest to excoriate the STL and its supporters.  Throughout 
the summer, opposition-aligned voices in the media had called 
for an investigation of Lebanese prosecutor general Saeed 
Mirza, whom they accused of being responsible for the 
imprisonment of the generals.  The same refrain was joined by 
the Syrian government on September 8 when it filed a letter 
with the UN Security Council accusing Detlev Mehlis, the head 
of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission 
(the STL's predecessor), of improperly targeting Syria 
through his investigation. 
 
5. (C) Members of the parliamentary majority, as well as 
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, believe that one of Hizballah's 
primary goals now is to derail the STL's investigation. 
Hizballah is "still afraid" of the STL, Prime 
Minister-designate Saad Hariri told the Ambassador on October 
2.  The group is "pre-positioning" itself for the outcome of 
the tribunal, accusing the STL of being politicized in order 
to diminish the impact should the STL accuse Hizballah of 
involvement in Hariri,s assassination.  Jumblatt, who has 
said that justice is in the hands of the STL, has publicly 
reiterated his claim that the Der Spiegel article was a 
fabrication planted to encourage sectarian tension in 
Lebanon.  Jumblatt's former allies in the majority ascribe 
his public statements to his conviction that an STL charge 
aimed at Hizballah would result in Sunni-Shia sectarian 
strife (ref B). Meanwhile, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon 
(UNSCOL) Michael Williams has predicted that the current 
"orchestrated assault" on the STL will only get more intense 
as time goes on. 
 
STL CONTINUES WORK 
OUTSIDE THE LIMELIGHT 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Although Hariri and his allies rally around the STL, 
 
they also emphasize that bringing charges is the 
responsibility of the tribunal and that they will accept any 
conclusion.  Given the lack of high-profile investigations on 
the ground, many in Lebanon wonder when the STL will take 
action.  Hariri himself, despite his pledge to find his 
father's killers, does not expect a resolution anytime soon. 
In discussing eventual STL indictments, Hariri predicted a 
"Milosevic-like" scenario entailing a long delay before those 
indicted were brought to trial in an October 2 conversation 
with the Ambassador.  The Prime Minister-designate indicated 
he would take a "non-confessional" position if the STL 
indicted Hizballah, emphasizing that he wanted STL 
prosecution and not a civil war.  He did not sense, however, 
that the STL investigation was nearing the stage of issuing 
indictments. 
 
7. (C) The STL's Beirut field office is increasing the pace 
of its interviews with witnesses, Valerio Aquila, the head of 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in Beirut, told polchief 
and Legatt on October 13.  The OTP, which began work on July 
1, houses around 20 permanent staff from both the OTP and the 
STL Registrar's office, in addition to a similar number of 
TDYers.  Although the OTP can summon witnesses directly 
itself, Valerio praised the "good cooperation" that his team 
has experienced with the Lebanese general prosecutor's 
office, headed by Mirza.  When the OTP contacts the general 
prosecutor to request a witness interview, he said, the 
prosecutor's office passes that request to the judicial 
police to be served, either in writing or verbally. 
 
8. (C) Aquila, who confided that he has thus far faced no 
difficulties in interviewing witnesses affiliated with 
Hizballah, expressed hope that the level of GOL cooperation 
will remain high in the future.  Nevertheless, Aquila 
underscored that the GOL has "lost its (legal) competence" in 
all issues related to the STL's mandate, and the tribunal is 
now working independently under a hybrid of general 
procedures inspired by international law while drawing from 
Lebanese criminal law to fill in legal gaps. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) March 14-aligned contacts continue to speculate that 
Hizballah will try to stymie the STL from within the 
government. From our conversation with OTP Chief Aquila, it 
would appear that the STL's work, supported by the Lebanese 
judiciary and law enforcement, has not to date been subject 
to political pressure. Nonetheless, the Special Tribunal will 
continue to be subject to intense scrutiny within Lebanese 
media and political circles. 
SISON