With Nahr al-Barid in LAF hands, defmin Murr claims Shakr al-Absi dead

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001346 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2027 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PARM, LE, SY, QA 
SUBJECT: WITH NAHR AL-BARID IN LAF HANDS, DEFMIN MURR 
CLAIMS SHAKR AL-ABSI DEAD 
 
BEIRUT 00001346  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, based on 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (S)  On 9/3, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister 
Elias Murr called the Ambassador to report that the wife of 
Fatah al-Islam (FAI) leader Shakr al-Absi had positively 
identified the body of her husband, apparently killed on the 
last day of fighting on 9/2 in the Nahr al-Barid camp.  While 
Murr said that formal confirmation would await DNA testing, 
he was now convinced that both Absi and Abu Selim Taha, 
another Fatah al-Islam leader, had been killed.  The LAF 
killed Nasser Ismail, another terrorist leader, 9/3  (We 
caution that, in Lebanon, preliminary information is often 
subsequently proven false; we recommend not commenting on 
Absi's death until formal confirmation by the GOL.)  Murr 
reported 39 FAI fighters killed on the last day and 19 
arrested (figures slightly above what the media is 
reporting).  Murr speculated that the decision by FAI to 
launch "kamikaze" operations early on 9/2 against the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was triggered by two 
developments:  first, FAI somehow knew that the USG, in the 
aftermath of CENTCOM Commander Fallon's visit, had delivered 
SMAW-D weapons to the LAF, capable of penetrating the FAI 
bunkers.  Second, Qatar was secretly brokering a potential 
surrender deal because of which FAI assumed the LAF had 
lowered its guard slightly (an FAI assumption Murr claimed 
was deadly wrong).  While MP Walid Jumblatt and PM Siniora's 
aide Mohamed Chatah found the Qatari role suspicious, Murr 
thought that the Qataris had merely been naive, hopeful of 
being seen as peacemakers as opposed to the Saudi fighters 
within FAI.  While a final tally of FAI terrorists killed 
needs to await further examination, 158 LAF soldiers and 
officers were killed in what is without question a victory 
for the LAF and for the state of Lebanon over international 
terrorists.  The USG role in keeping the LAF equipped was 
essential to this success.  End summary. 
 
MURR CONVINCED SHAKR AL-ABSI IS DEAD 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (S)  After having met with the Ambassador for over two 
hours on 9/1 to discuss, inter alia, developments in Nahar 
al-Barid, Deputy PM and Defense Minister Elias Murr updated 
us by phone throughout the day on 9/2 regarding what turned 
out to be the final battle for the Nahr al-Barid refugee 
camp, in which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) prevailed over 
the Fatah al-Islam (FAI) terrorists.  On 9/3, Murr phoned to 
say that the body of FAI leader Shakr al-Absi (sentenced in 
death in Jordan for the 2002 murder of USAID diplomat Larry 
Foley) had been positively identified in six individual 
visits:  four captured FAI fighters who were with Absi in the 
bunker, a Palestinian cleric ("Sheikh Hajj") who had 
negotiated with Absi on and off through the Nahr al-Barid 
battle, and, most convincingly, his wife, who Murr said broke 
down into hysterics upon seeing the body, cursing and 
pummeling with her fists those accompanying her to the 
Tripoli hospital. 
 
3.  (S)  Murr said that, with the face badly disfigured by 
burning, he would await the results of DNA testing (comparing 
Absi with his son, in detention) before making formal 
confirmation, probably on Tuesday, of Absi's death.  But he 
said that he was convinced.  He also claimed that witnesses 
had identified the body of Abu Selim Taha, another FAI 
leader.  Mid-day on 9/3, Murr called to report that Nasser 
Ismail, who had been a leader of FAI's terrorist operations, 
had remained hidden in the Nahr al-Barid ruins.  When he 
tried to escape with four others on 9/3 after the fighting 
had stopped, the LAF killed him as well, arresting the four 
others. 
 
"KAMIKAZE" OPERATION ON FINAL DAY 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (S)  Murr's account of the last day of the battle varies 
slightly from what other sources and the media are reporting 
(and we note that there might never be a single, accurate 
account, although the picture should become clearer in the 
coming days).  Murr described a "kamikaze" FAI operation that 
started on 9/2 at about 3 a.m. against LAF positions, after 
what had been a relatively quiet night.  (Other sources say 
 
BEIRUT 00001346  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
that LAF pounding had provoked the suicidal assault by FAI.) 
Consistent with other reports, Murr said that the FAI assault 
was designed in part to distract the LAF while some FAI 
fighters and leaders took other routes to escape the camp. 
Murr said that the LAF, which suffered five deaths of its own 
on 9/2 (bringing the total LAF deaths to 158 since 5/20), 
ultimately killed 39 FAI fighters, including six who were 
tracked down outside the camp (including a couple in "sleeper 
cell" awakened in Tripoli), and arrested 19.  (The media 
reports 35 killed and 15 arrested.) 
 
5.  (S)  Murr praised the people of Tripoli in the 
surrounding area, saying that they had helped the army in 
trying to locate FAI fighters trying to escape.  While he did 
not rule out the possibility that a few might have managed to 
evade the tight LAF checkpoints established throughout the 
country and the vigilance of local Lebanese, he did not 
believe that FAI leaders or large numbers had gotten away. 
The Ambassador noted that, as of 9/1, Murr estimated that 95 
FAI fighters remained in the camp.  If 39 (including two from 
the sleeper cell) were killed and 19 arrested, that left 
30-40 FAI fighters unaccounted for from his estimates on 
Saturday.  Murr said to await final investigation of the 
bunkers, interrogation of those arrested, etc.  He said that 
more bodies may be discovered in the bunkers.  Murr said that 
he regretted that Absi had been killed, given the 
intelligence value of his interrogation. 
 
MURR SPECULATES THAT FAI ASSAULT 
DUE TO U.S. WEAPONRY, QATARI DIPLOMACY 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (S)  Asked what had provoked the FAI "kamikaze" assault 
early on 9/2, Murr said that he thought two factors came into 
play.  First, FAI probably had received word somehow about 
the arrival of the U.S.-provided SMAW-D weaponry, a tangible 
result of the 8/26 visit of CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon. 
 "We know they somehow we able to monitor what was happening 
outside the camp," Murr said.  FAI probably had incomplete 
understanding about what the USG was providing but knew that 
the LAF had new technology to enable penetration of the last 
FAI bunkers.  "For all the reasons you know, we can't thank 
you as much publicly as you deserve," Murr said, "but please 
pass on my personal appreciation to everyone."  Second, the 
FAI fighters had assumed, because of a Qatari diplomatic 
effort aimed at getting FAI to surrender, that the LAF would 
be more relaxed than usual, allowing the FAI assault to 
successfully distract the LAF as other FAI fighters and 
leaders escaped.  The FAI was "deadly wrong" in assuming the 
LAF was not on full alert, Murr said. 
 
QATARI NEGOTIATIONS ON FAI SURRENDER? 
------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (S)  Earlier, on 9/1, Murr had gone into detail into what 
he insisted was a Qatari diplomatic effort to persuade the 
remaining FAI fighters to surrender.  According to Murr's 
report, an official from Doha arrived a few days ago to work 
with the Qatari ambassador.  Using the Palestinian cleric 
"Sheikh Hajj" as an intermediary with FAI, the Qataris 
presented three conditions to the LAF for FAI surrender, all 
of which Murr accepted:  presence of the Qataris when the FAI 
fighters emerged from their bunkers (to prevent the LAF from 
executing them), presence of ICRC personnel on the buses 
transporting them to MOD (to prevent enraged local Lebanese 
or relatives of killed LAF soldiers from murdering them en 
route), and ICRC access to them in the MOD prison to ensure 
no mistreatment.  Late on 9/1, Murr called to report that FAI 
had asked for a fourth condition, that the families of Shakr 
al-Absi and Abu Selim Taha be given safe passage to Damascus, 
a condition Murr said he had not accepted. 
 
8.  (S)  Asked why the Qataris would be involved, Murr mused 
that it had to do with Qatar's competition with Saudi Arabia. 
 Look at the contrast, he urged.  If successful, Qatar would 
appear to be a peacemaker, a successful diplomatic player. 
By contrast, many of the fighters who would emerge in a 
surrender of the 95 persons thought to be remaining on 9/1 (a 
number passed from Sheikh Hajj to the Qataris) would be 
Saudis.  This would be a great embarrassment to Saudi Arabia. 
 According to Sheikh Hajj, the Qataris themselves did not 
take the initiative to get involved but were suggested by 
Shakr al-Absi as potential intermediaries.  But they quickly 
 
BEIRUT 00001346  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
saw the diplomatic value of saying yes.  In the aftermath of 
the 9/2 FAI assault, Murr thought that the Qataris had been 
"naive," tricked into persuading the LAF to stand back (which 
he insisted the LAF never did).  Predictably, MP Walid 
Jumblatt and Senior Advisor to PM Siniora Mohamed Chatah 
(both of whom independently told the Ambassador of Qatar's 
supposed diplomatic initiative) were more suspicious, with 
Jumblatt calling the Qatari role "fishy," and Chatah claiming 
that "the Qataris are not naive." 
 
INVESTIGATIONS OF CAPTURED FAI FIGHTERS 
TO BE CONDUCTED JOINTLY BY LAF-ISF, MURR SAYS 
------------------------------- 
 
9.  (S)  Murr reported that the investigation of the captured 
FAI fighters would be conducted by a joint task force made up 
of seven officers from the LAF's G-2 intelligence division 
and seven officers from the Internal Security Service's 
intelligence division, under the leadership of the G-2's 
General Georges Khoury and the ISF's Col. Wissam al-Hassan. 
It is essential that the two intelligence agencies cooperate, 
Murr said.  If the G-2 had sole authority and discovered 
Saudi or even Hariri connections to Fatah al-Islam, then the 
ISF and even March 14 political leaders would tend to 
disregard the findings as being somehow politicized against 
them.  By contrast, if the ISF were in charge and found 
Syrian links, then the LAF and March 8-Aoun politicians would 
claim that the ISF is exaggerating and distorting to advance 
March 14 political goals.  Only a joint operation will blunt 
the ability of either political camp discrediting the 
investigations and interrogations.  Murr said that the USG 
and other friendly countries would certainly be asked for 
assistance, and he promised to see that the USG had access to 
information captured, interrogation reports, weaponry seized, 
etc. 
 
10.  (S)  Asked to speculate based on what he knew already 
what would be discovered, Murr said that he thought that Saad 
Hariri and Lebanon's Sunni politicians were "lucky," in that 
all of the Lebanese FAI fighters had been killed.  He thought 
that the investigation would, however, uncover some 
"extremely minor" links between some FAI leaders and the 
Hariris and/or Saudis, from before FAI emerged as a terrorist 
force.  While these links would be similar to other Hariri or 
Saudi financing of any number of Sunni institutions, "of 
course" March 8-Aoun politicians will try to trumpet them as 
proof that Hariri and the Saudis back terrorists.  That is 
not true, Murr insisted:  the point now is that the Hariris 
and Saudis fully backed the LAF against FAI.  Any "stupid 
contributions" should be ignored, and they will be proven to 
be "a long time ago" and insignificant, he predicted.  Murr 
also thought that there would be some evidence that Syria had 
facilitated the movement of foreign fighters from Iraq to 
Lebanon, including those who joined up with FAI.  But, based 
on what he knew so far, he did not expect major revelations 
linking Syria operationally to FAI.  "I wish I could say 
otherwise," he said, "but it doesn't seem to be true that 
Syria controlled Fatah al-Islam." 
 
COMMENT 
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11.  (S)  Murr is justifiably proud of the LAF and pleased 
with his own role -- perhaps somewhat embellished in his 
telling, but we'll indulge him, given the clearly positive 
influence he exercised -- in pushing an initially reluctant 
LAF Commander and a worried, hesitant cabinet into going all 
the way in wiping out FAI's strongholds in Nahr al-Barid. 
While describing a much-welcome happy ending to a long, tough 
struggle, Murr's specific comments should be seen as an 
initial read-out of the end of the Nahr al-Barid fight, 
subject to further revisions as the details become more 
clear.  But, after 105 days of fierce fighting, the LAF and 
GOL can be proud of an unexpected and unprecedented victory 
by the state over a terrorist organization that had 
established remarkably deep roots quickly in a lawless bit of 
Lebanese territory. 
 
12.  (S)  Counting severe injuries, the LAF suffered roughly 
a one-for-one casualty rate with FAI fighters killed in order 
to defeat Fatah al-Islam.  In the process, it established 
itself as the only truly cross-confessional state institution 
that has received near universal backing from Lebanon's 
 
BEIRUT 00001346  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
otherwise divided population.  With the execution by FAI of 
LAF soldiers on 5/20, the LAF was forced into this battle 
woefully under-equipped.  USG responsiveness, in establishing 
an emergency airlift of needed ammunition and supplies and by 
working at unprecedented speed to approve third-party 
transfers, played an essential role in the LAF's success. 
Now, as we have reported previously, the "day after" will 
pose new and equally difficult challenges to the GOL, 
although we hope they are more of a political rather than 
security nature. 
FELTMAN