Israel hits southern Beirut hard; airport struck again

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2016 
TAGS: IS, LE, MOPS, PTER 
SUBJECT: TFLE01:  ISRAEL HITS SOUTHERN BEIRUT HARD; AIRPORT 
STRUCK AGAIN 
 
REF: BEIRUT 2349 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman.  Reason:  Section 1.4 (d) 
. 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1.  (C)  Subsequent to reftel, Israeli aircraft have bombed 
two small airports, a power plant, and struck hard at targets 
in the southern suburbs of Beirut.  Two rockets were reported 
to have struck Haifa, but Hizballah denied responsibility and 
UNIFIL could not confirm that the rockets were launched from 
Lebanon.  Press is reporting that three Lebanese civilians 
were killed and 50 wounded in the Israeli airstrikes on the 
southern suburbs.  All five MEA planes left BIA by 1100 hrs. 
local this morning.  Embassy contacts expressed frustration 
with Hizballah for provoking a major escalation with Israel. 
End summary. 
 
SUMMARY OF EVENTS 
IN LAST 24 HOURS 
---------------- 
 
2.  (C)  The following is an update of events since reftel 
using UN sources and Embassy contacts, and where necessary, 
press reporting.  All times are approximate and in local time. 
 
July 13 
 
1500  Rumors surfaced that Israel threatened to bomb the 
southern suburbs of Beirut and warned residents to evacuate. 
A trusted Shia journalist who lives in south Beirut reported 
to polstaff that no one was taking the warning seriously.  In 
fact, Shia morale in south Beirut was high, and Hizballah 
buses were collecting people for a 1700 demonstration. 
 
1600  UN Political Officer Georges Nasr briefed econoff on 
the current situation in the south.  According to Nasr, 
sporadic gunfire exchanges have continued throughout the day 
at various points along the Blue Line.  A few more Israeli 
airstrikes were reported this afternoon.  UNIFIL observed 
three Israeli gunboats crossing the line of buoys that 
represents the maritime Blue Line.  Later, UNIFIL observed 
one gunboat off the coast just north of Naqoura and another 
off Tyre.  The third is unaccounted for.  As of 1600 hrs. 
local, UNIFIL had not observed any Israeli ground forces in 
Lebanon. 
 
1700  Two small airports were hit by Israeli airstrikes.  The 
first is Quleiat Airport, located 20 km northeast of Tripoli 
near the Syrian border, and the second is Rayak Airfield, a 
small utility airfield in the Biqa' Valley.  (See 05 BEIRUT 
4117 for background on Quleiat Airport.)  An official at the 
Ministry of Transportation confirmed these reports. 
 
2100  Two rockets hit Haifa, Israel.  Hizballah denied that 
its fighters launched the rockets.  UNIFIL did not observe 
the rockets launched from Lebanon, and has no further 
information to confirm or dispute Israeli claims. 
 
2120  Israeli gunboats bombarded Beirut International 
Airport, setting fuel tanks on fire. 
 
 
July 14 
 
0330  Israeli aircraft pounded the southern suburbs of 
Beirut.  Explosions, sonic booms, and antiaircraft artillery 
fire could be heard at the Embassy.  Press reported three 
Lebanese civilians dead and 50 wounded.  Embassy contacts in 
the southern suburbs have left the area.  In the morning, a 
large pillar of black smoke hung over Beirut. 
 
Early morning  Israeli jets bombed power plant in Jiyye, just 
north of Sidon. 
 
0430-0900  UNIFIL observed very little fighting in southern 
Lebanon, apart from some sporadic gunfire. 
 
0500  Israeli jets struck the PFLP-GC base at Qussaya in the 
Biqa' Valley just a few kilometers from the Syrian border. 
(See 05 BEIRUT 1604 for background information on the PLFP-GC 
base.) 
 
0800  Al Manar tlevision station claimed Israeli jets bombed 
 
BEIRUT 00002386  002 OF 003 
 
 
a television antenna in the Biqa' Valley. 
 
0822  Unconfirmed reports of Israeli gunboats shelling north 
of Sidon. 
 
0825  An Israeli air raid against a major bridge of the 
Beirut-Damascus highway has made that bridge impassable. 
 
0900  UNIFIL observed Israeli airstrikes near Khiam. 
 
1030  UNIFIL reported Israeli artillery shells falling in 
southern Lebanon near the Blue Line.  There is little to no 
return fire from Lebanon at this time.  No Israeli ground 
forces observed inside Lebanon. 
 
1030  UN Political Officer told econoff that it appears 
Middle Eastern Airlines will be able to evacuate its 
remaining five aircraft from the airport, pending UN 
negotiations. 
 
1100  All five MEA planes and one private plane (belonging to 
former PM Mikati) successfully left BIA by 1100.  PM Siniora, 
Central Bank Governor Salameh expressed their appreciation to 
the U.S. President and USG for their help on this matter. 
 
1125  Israel dropped four bombs on the two runways at BIA, 
according to Civil Aviation DG Hamdi Chaouk. 
 
REACTIONS TO ISRAELI STRIKES 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Speaking with emboff on July 13, former Information 
Minister Michel Samaha characterized the ongoing Israeli 
reaction as a "normal" one.  Based on his reading of public 
Israeli statements, he did not expect "real escalation."  No 
Israeli military action was capable of changing the internal 
situation in Lebanon.  Only internal Lebanese dialogue can 
make that happen.  This is the task that lies ahead once the 
situation calms down.  Rather than the national dialogue, he 
advocated the formation of trilateral negotiations among MP 
Saad Hariri, Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, 
and MP Michel Aoun.  This arrangement was necessary to "cook" 
a solution before the broader National Dialogue process 
started up again.  (Comment:  Samaha may be taking 
inspiration from the Syrian-brokered Tripartite Agreement of 
the 1980s, which brought together the LF, Amal, and the PSP, 
and in which he played a major "fixer" role.  End comment.) 
 
4.  (C)  Samaha did not argue with the suggestion that the 
ongoing crisis has diminished Aoun's credibility, but 
insisted that the Lebanese still need to build on the 
"bridge" that Aoun extended to Nasrallah.  The idea is to get 
the Maronite and Sunni communities jointly to "contain" 
Hizballah.  The only alternative is "civil war with 
Hizballah."  The immediate task, Samaha said, is to find a 
way to get Saad Hariri back to Lebanon, in order to get 3-way 
talks started. 
 
5.  (C)  Separately on July 13, Aounist MP Farid el-Khazen 
told emboff that Lebanon was in a "terrible situation," and 
that he did not "see a way out."  He saw Hizballah's 
kidnapping of Israeli soldiers as a "carbon copy" of what 
provoked the ongoing crisis in Gaza, and worried about the 
implications of Israeli retaliation.  He was also furious at 
what he saw as Nasrallah's lies at the national dialogue 
promising to keep the Blue Line quiet this summer.  He 
admitted that Aoun's agreement with Hizballah is becoming 
hard to defend. 
 
SHIA JOURNALIST FLEES SOUTH 
BEIRUT; VIEWS HIZBALLAH STRATEGY 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  On July 13, Ali al-Amin, columnist for the Arabic 
language daily al-Balad and son of Shia "third way" leader 
Sheikh Mohammad Hassan al-Amin, told emboff that he had taken 
his family out of Beirut's southern suburbs because of 
reports that the Israelis had called on the civilian 
population to evacuate.  Amin noted that, were Israel 
actually to launch attacks on Beirut (which it later did), 
his family would be in a fix, since moving to their village 
home in southern Lebanon is no longer an option, either. 
 
7.  (C)  Offering his analysis of why Hizballah provoked the 
violence by kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, Amin described 
Hizballah as being made up of two wings:  a military/security 
 
BEIRUT 00002386  003 OF 003 
 
 
wing, and a political wing.  The military/security wing held 
decision-making authority, with Imad Mughaniyeh as one of the 
central figures.  In recent years, especially following 
Syria's withdrawal, however, a large portion of Hizballah's 
membership took interest in a more "political" direction, and 
had seen that doing so could lead to benefits (such as 
participation in a cabinet for the first time).  In this 
spirit, Hizballah officials revived discussion of the 
"Elisar" land development project, for example, talking about 
turning that area into a major tourism zone.  While "some 
were betting on this new trend," according to Amin, 
Hizballah's military/security wing decided to re-assert 
control.  Taking into consideration Iranian calculations 
(such as in the Persian Gulf and the nuclear issue) and the 
situation in Gaza, they decided to launch the July 12 attack 
on the Blue Line, and, in so doing, "open a battle" with 
Israel. 
 
8.  (C)  The hostage-taking of July 12 had been planned for 
some time, according to Amin.  It was fair to say that 
Hizballah, in the lead-up to July 12,  had taken advantage of 
recent steps that suggested it was going in the opposite 
(that is, a more "political") direction, such as the February 
6 agreement with Michel Aoun.  Amin suggested that some in 
Hizballah -- presumably in the military/security wing -- 
share an interest with the Israelis in the kind of 
destruction that would set Lebanon back, as some Israeli 
officials have reportedly threatened, 20 years or so. 
 
9.  (C)  Amin said there were two possible outcomes to the 
current situation, and he was worried about both.  If 
Hizballah wins, this would mean that the project of building 
a Lebanese state had failed decisively.  If Hizballah loses, 
this would portend even greater sectarian strife in Lebanon. 
Regarding the second possibility, Amin said that most 
Lebanese Shia see Hizballah not as "the resistance," and not 
in terms of confrontation with Israel, but rather as the most 
powerful defender of Shia communal interests against threats 
from other Lebanese communal groups.  Amin suggested that it 
was difficult to imagine that Lebanese Shias pushing for a 
political "third way" independent of both Hizballah and Amal 
would be able to make much progress in the current situation. 
 
FELTMAN