Relations with Syria: cosmetic changes thus far?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000155 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO WARLICK 
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY 
USUN FOR WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN 
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, SY, LE 
SUBJECT: LEBANON: RELATIONS WITH SYRIA:  COSMETIC CHANGES 
THUS FAR? 
 
REF: A. USUN 83 
     B. BEIRUT 148 
     C. BEIRUT 129 
     D. BEIRUT 124 
     E. BEIRUT 46 
     F. 08 BEIRUT 1542 
     G. 08 BEIRUT 1449 
     H. 08 BEIRUT 1201 
     I. 08 BEIRUT 1173 
 
BEIRUT 00000155  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Six months after the August 13-14 summit in Damascus 
between President Michel Sleiman and Syrian President Bashar 
Asad (Ref H), there has been little substantive progress, 
from the Lebanese point of view, on any of the key bilateral 
issues:  exchange of Ambassadors, border security 
cooperation, and Lebanese detainees in Syria.  Syria is 
saying many of           the right things, some Lebanese 
interlocutors believe, but many in Lebanon view this 
primarily as Syria's attempt to ingratiate itself with the 
international community, rather than demonstrating a sincere 
commitment to improving relations with Lebanon. 
 
2. (C) Meanwhile, the steady stream of senior GOL official 
visits to Syria has not yet been reciprocated, leaving the 
Lebanese with the perception that Lebanon is still under 
Syrian tutelage.  Furthermore, with the fourth anniversary of 
the February 14, 2005 assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri 
approaching, many Lebanese hope that the March 1 start date 
for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Ref A) will put an end 
once and for all to Syrian influence in Lebanon, although 
they are concerned that Asad continues to challenge the 
authority of the Tribunal.  Finally, while it has been over a 
year since the last assassination of a March 14 figure, we 
are beginning once again to hear mounting anecdotal concerns 
about security threats against March 14 leaders.  End summary. 
 
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: A ONE-WAY STREET 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Following the August 13-14, 2008 summit in Damascus, 
Lebanon and Syria formally established diplomatic relations 
on October 15.  Syria fulfilled its pledge to open an embassy 
in Lebanon before the end of 2008, in what we see as the only 
tangible progress in the bilateral relationship.  However, it 
has failed thus far to nominate an ambassador, leaving a 
First Secretary in charge of the mission, and waited until 
the last possible moment to grant agrement to Michel Khoury, 
Lebanon's current Ambassador to Cyprus and 
Ambassador-designate to Damascus.  Speaking on LBC television 
on February 5, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt called the August 
summit a "quarter victory," referring to the opening of 
Syria's embassy in Beirut, which he labeled "a nest of spies 
next to my house." 
 
4. (C) Meanwhile, there has been no further discussion 
regarding the fate of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council, the 
umbrella organization covering numerous foreign, economic, 
and security relations between the two countries (Ref F). 
Although generally perceived by March 14 contacts as a 
mechanism for extending Syria's influence over Lebanon, they 
say now is not the time to challenge its authority, 
preferring not to upset the apple cart.  Council Secretary 
General Nasri Khoury, however, continues to play a central 
role in the bilateral relationship, acting as liaison between 
the two countries and participating in GOL officials' 
meetings with Syrian counterparts in Damascus. 
 
5. (C) The steady stream of GOL visitors to Damascus since 
August, most recently Defense Minister Elias Murr (Ref C) 
have not yet been reciprocated.  Opposition leaders who have 
traveled to Syria include Youth and Sports Minister Talal 
 
BEIRUT 00000155  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
Arslan (August 26), Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh (October 
15), Agriculture Minister Elias Skaff (November 3), former PM 
Karame (September 10), and Free Patriotic Movement leader 
Michel Aoun (December 3-7). 
 
6. (C) On the March 14 side, Information Minister Tarek Mitri 
and Culture Minister Tamam Salam attended November 16 
conferences of Arab Information and Culture Ministers, 
respectively.  Two of Sleiman's hand-picked ministers, 
Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud (November 10) and Defense 
Minister Elias Murr (January 28), traveled to Damascus to 
discuss border and security cooperation, as did Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Jean Kahwagi on November 
29 and LAF Intelligence (G-2) head BG Edmond Fadl shortly 
before that. 
 
BORDER TALKS:  ALL TALK, NO ACTION 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Despite receiving assurances from their Syrian 
counterparts that Syria intends to embark on a new era of 
relations with Lebanon, the delegations returned largely 
empty-handed.  Baroud's visit followed Syrian troop 
deployments on the northern Lebanese border during extremist 
violence in Tripoli in October; the Syrians, who claimed the 
deployment was to prevent extremists from entering Syria and 
to crack down on smuggling, failed to notify the GOL of their 
actions, instead communicating through LAF Commander Kahwagi 
(Ref G).  Baroud reportedly secured a commitment to 
reactivate the bilateral security committee.  However, while 
the GOL has followed up by nominating representatives to the 
committee, we have seen no evidence of further bilateral 
cooperation.  (Note: Smuggling, especially of fuel, has 
reportedly halted since September, but this is attributed to 
lower fuel prices rather than increased border controls.  End 
note.) 
 
8. (C) Defense Minister Murr claimed he was treated with 
"perfect" protocol during his visit, for this first time on 
equal terms with his counterpart rather than a Syrian 
"minion" (Ref C).  On the Palestinian bases (Qousaya and 
Hilwe) straddling the Lebanese-Syrian border, Murr said 
President Asad refused to acknowledge that weapons were 
coming from Syria, but claimed the two countries would set up 
a joint team tasked with finding a solution to the situation 
of people living in the camps.  Murr further claimed that 
both sides agreed to establish security checkpoints on both 
sides of the border, and hoped that changes would become 
visible on the ground quickly.  We will continue to monitor 
this closely; however, we find it difficult to see how 
Lebanon's already stretched security forces will be able to 
staff the 82 checkpoints Murr claims he will establish in the 
next six months. 
 
NO PROGRESS ON DETAINEES 
------------------------ 
 
9. (C) Although Sleiman cited Lebanese detainees in Syria as 
one of his key priorities for the August 13-14 summit, there 
has been no progress on this issue.  In an August 20 
television interview, March 14 Justice Minister Ibrahim 
Najjar said there were 745 detainees, divided into two 
categories:  convicted criminals and victims of enforced 
disappearances."  On September 7, the Syians responded with 
a list of names of 115 convicted Lebanese held in Syrian 
jails, with no reference to "enforced disappearances." 
 
10. (C) According to the Lebanese NGO Support of Lebanese in 
Detention and Exile (SOLIDE), by end 2008 Syria still had not 
granted approval for Lebanese judges to visit the detainees, 
although it agreed in principle.  Reflecting Lebanese 
frustration with the lack of progress on this issue was the 
recent formation of yet another advocate group in Lebanon, 
with a more pro-March 14 bent than the pro-Aoun SOLIDE (Ref 
E).  Even Aoun, who hoped to bring hope detainees to bolster 
his own support domestically, failed to make headway. 
 
ALL EYES ON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL 
 
BEIRUT 00000155  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
---------------------------- 
 
11. (C) With the fourth anniversary of the February 14, 2005 
assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri approaching, and the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) scheduled to begin on 
March 1, many March 14 leaders hold high hopes that the 
Tribunal will promote constructive change in Lebanon by 
implicating the Syrian regime and changing regional dynamics. 
 However, they view Syrian President Asad's recent interview 
with al-Manar, in which he reiterated that Syrian citizens 
are subject only to Syrian jurisdiction, and that there must 
be an agreement on rights and obligations between the STL and 
Syria before Syria will cooperate with the Tribunal, as a 
challenge to the STL's authority.  Jumblatt told his tv 
interviewer that President Asad "would not allow the (STL) to 
try even a sergeant in his regime." 
 
12. (C) Meanwhile, some conspiracy theorists in Lebanon 
suggest the current row over wiretapping is an effort to 
hinder the GOL's ability to share evidence with the STL by 
arguing that the evidence was obtained illegally.  Following 
a February 5 meeting of the parliamentary Media and 
Telecommunications Committee, Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar 
(March 14) confirmed that the STL had asked him to talk to 
Telecommunications Minister Gebran Bassil (Aoun) to 
facilitate information-sharing with the Tribunal.  Former 
Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh (March 14) 
complained that the Ministry was "withholding" data related 
to "certain attacks."  Jumblatt echoed this complaint, 
specifically accusing the Ministry of withholding data needed 
by UNIIIC to investigate the Hariri assassination and related 
crimes.  "The side that controls the Ministry of 
Communications is hostile and affiliated with the Syrian 
regime," he told his television interviewer. 
 
MOUNTING SECURITY THREATS 
------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Most worrisome of all, an increasing number of March 
14 leaders have confided to us in recent weeks that they are 
receiving warnings about their personal security.  Both Walid 
Jumblatt and Samir Geagea (in addition to Saad Hariri) are 
staying close to home, as are March 14 MP Boutros Harb and 
independent Greek Orthodox MP Michel Murr, who only leaves 
his house under cover of darkness (Ref B).  Independent (but 
close to March 14) MP Mansour Ilbon told us Harb has warned 
him to take precautions as well.  Akkar MP Hadi Hobeich 
warned during a February 5 parliamentary session that two 
Tripoli MPs were under threat, and we also have heard 
separately that March 14 Tripoli MPs have received warnings 
of a Fatah al-Islam attack against them. 
 
EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED INTERNAL MEDDLING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
14. (C) March 14 contacts cite Syrian opposition to a 
centrist parliamentary bloc as one reason President Sleiman 
is reluctant to openly support independent candidates.  To 
the surprise of his March 14 colleagues, Defense Minister 
Elias Murr openly supported opposition (Aoun) 
Telecommunications Minister Gebran Bassil in the wiretapping 
affair, only days after he held an "unscheduled" tete-a-tete 
with President Asad, although he reportedly opposed Bassil 
during internal discussions.  General Aoun contends he is not 
receiving external financing (Ref D), but many in March 14 
believe he received Syrian assurances of support during his 
December visit, where, according to press reports, he 
received "royal treatment." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
15. (C) Six months later, we view the changes in the 
Lebanese-Syrian relationship as cosmetic, thus far.  While 
Syria continues to say many of the right things -- for the 
benefit of its international audience -- we see little 
evidence of progress on the ground in Lebanon.  We expect 
both sides will be looking to the start-up of the STL as a 
 
BEIRUT 00000155  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
clue to where the relationship is going.  With its allies in 
the opposition apparently sitting comfortably with respect to 
the June 7 parliamentary elections, Syria has no incentive 
either to stir things up in Lebanon or cede ground to the 
March 14 government.  March 14, pinning its hopes on the 
Tribunal, already is planning numerous local activities to 
celebrate the March 1 launch, while we view Asad's comments 
as a warning that Syria will not be easily pressured. 
 
SISON