Saudi ambassador on Syria, Hezbollah, Saad

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK 
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY 
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, UNSC, LE, SY, IS, IR 
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON SYRIA, HIZBALLAH, SAAD 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 129 
     B. 08 BEIRUT 1468 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Abdulaziz Khoja told the 
Ambassador that Saudi King Abdullah's outreach to Syrian 
President Bashar Asad was necessary to limit Iran's influence 
in the Arab world.  Bashar, for his part, is playing all 
sides off each other, but that strategy would only be viable 
for a short time, Khoja assessed.  Saudi Arabia was anxious 
to have the Arab countries present a united front at the next 
Arab League summit, scheduled in late March. 
 
2. (C) Iran, Hizballah, and Israel are the unpredictable 
actors, especially in Lebanon, he said.  Khoja called the 
period from now until Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary 
elections "unstable," but was mildly optimistic that Saad 
Hariri's March 14 coalition could win the elections, barring 
"something bad" happening, such as political assassinations 
or violence in the Palestinian refugee camps.  He informed 
the Ambassador that MP Michel Murr and his allies, the 
Armenian Tashnaq, would surely deliver all eight seats in the 
Metn (one of several contentious Christian districts) to 
March 14, which is not consistent with what others have told 
us.  According to Khoja, Hariri "really wants to become Prime 
Minister" and would accept the position, if offered by the 
opposition, should March 14 lose in the elections.  End 
summary. 
 
SYRIA SHOULD COME BACK 
TO THE ARAB FOLD 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Abdulaziz Khoja told the 
Ambassador February 2 that Saudi King Abdullah had reached 
out to Syrian President Bashar Asad to bring Syria "back to 
the Arab world" and keep Iran out.  The Saudi leadership 
believed it "helped" Syria by proposing reconciliation at a 
recent summit in Kuwait, but "we still have work to do," 
Khoja said, to ensure Syria would make the "right choice, and 
quickly."  Khoja surmised that the U.S. and Europe would 
support such action in the short term, but said Asad would 
need to show that he has a clear vision of how to approach 
difficult issues, such as what Syria would do about 
Hizballah, Hamas, terrorism, and Israel, if Asad hoped to get 
anywhere with the new U.S. administration. 
 
4. (C) Khoja said the Saudi leadership "does not trust" Asad. 
 He implied that Asad was trying to play all sides against 
each other, for Syria's benefit, a similar sentiment to what 
other interlocutors have told us (Ref A).  As an example, he 
pointed to Asad's close advisor and former Syrian 
intelligence chief Mohammad Abu Wael Nassif's alleged recent 
visit to Iran, on Asad's instruction, for consultations. 
However, Khoja declared it was important for Arab countries 
to remain united, especially at the next Arab League summit 
in March.  He expressed concern that Qatar was also "playing 
a dirty game," but the Saudis did not know why.  Despite 
Lebanese President Michel Sleiman's efforts, Khoja said 
Sleiman could not play an effective role as mediator between 
Syria and the other Arab states because the Lebanese-Syrian 
relationship remained "imbalanced." "Syria does not consider 
Lebanon an equal country," he said. 
 
REGIONAL WILDCARDS: IRAN, 
HIZBALLAH, AND ISRAEL 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Khoja accused Iran of "destroying" the internal 
political situation in Arab countries.  Referencing the 
December/January Gaza conflict, Khoja called Israel's actions 
"shameful," but implied that Hamas was pushed to engage in 
the conflict by Iran.  He was not certain whether Hizballah 
wanted the Gaza conflict to escalate, but alleged that Iran 
held all the control.  Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah, Khoja 
 
BEIRUT 00000139  002 OF 003 
 
 
continued, miscalculated by verbally attacking Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak during the conflict, as the Egyptian 
people rallied behind Mubarak instead.  Khoja said this 
demonstrated Nasrallah was losing credibility, and believed 
this could push Hizballah to take any action, at any time, if 
it felt threatened.  He reported that the Saudis' concerns 
about their safety in Lebanon were heightened after 
Nasrallah's attack on Mubarak. 
 
6. (C) The Saudi Ambassador worried that regional conflicts 
could spill into Lebanon from now until the June 7 
parliamentary elections.  Calling the current time period 
"unstable," he said anything was possible if Hizballah 
received orders from Iran, including the threat of 
assassinations of political figures or incitement of an 
intifada in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps. (Note: In a 
separate conversation later the same day, Lebanese Armed 
Forces Commander General Kahwagi told the Ambassador he was 
also very concerned about potential trouble in the camps, 
especially Ain el-Hilwe.  End note.)  Khoja said he had heard 
rumors that March 14 leaders Samir Geagea (Lebanese Forces) 
and Walid Jumblatt (Druze), as well as MP Boutros Harb were 
all warned of security threats against them.  (Note: Indeed 
all three March 14 figures have relayed concerns about their 
personal security to us, as well.  End note.) 
 
7. (C) On Israel, he worried that Israel may reenter Gaza or 
open a conflict with south Lebanon.  He was especially 
afraid, he said, of the next few days prior to the Israeli 
election on February 10.  A win for Benyamin Netanyah would 
be "good for Syria, but bad for the Palesinians," he said, 
because of Israeli border inteests.  Khoja said Saudi 
Arabia's interest in Lebanon is that it remain stable.  If 
Lebanon and Syria were stable, then Saudi Arabia would be 
stable, he argued. 
 
KHOJA: "MARCH 14 WILL WIN, 
DEFINITELY, INSHALLAH" AND 
"SAAD REALLY WANTS TO BE PM" 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Although Hariri and Jumblatt had both met with 
Hizballah representatives, separately, to discuss security 
concerns, Khoja was disturbed that Jumblatt settled for 
meeting Hizballah MP Mohammad Raad January 21, instead of 
Nasrallah himself.  "If you are leader, then you should meet 
with the leader," he said.  However, Khoja said "definitely, 
in'shallah" Hariri's March 14 coalition would win Lebanon's 
parliamentary elections.  He was confident that independent, 
Greek Orthodox MP Michel Murr would join Hariri's candidate 
list in the contentious Metn district, bringing the Armenian 
vote and delivering all eight parliamentary seats to March 14 
there.  Khoja affirmed that he met with Murr regularly, and 
assured the Ambassador that Murr was on "our side," as well 
as the Armenian Tashnaq party. 
 
9. (C) It would not be the end of the world if the opposition 
won the elections, Khoja said, but it would be a symbolic 
defeat that would imply, "Iran won."  The Ambassador urged 
Khoja to continue to use his influence with March 14's 
leadership, directly and indirectly, to encourage them in 
developing a winning program and candidate lists.  The 
Ambassador inquired about rumors she heard that Saad Hariri 
planned to join a national unity government as PM, even if 
the opposition wins the elections.  Khoja admitted that the 
Saudis had already counseled Hariri against doing so, arguing 
it would be better for Hariri to "let them (the opposition) 
fail" and not take the blame for their mistakes.  However, he 
continued, Hariri "really wants to become Prime Minister," 
and speculated that Hariri would take the job, if offered, 
even in a government where the current opposition was in the 
majority. 
 
10. (C) Separately, a Tripoli MP from Hariri's Future 
Movement claimed that the Saudis have been promoting a deal 
to distribute the eight parliamentary seats in Tripoli 
equally among candidates of four Sunni leaders: Hariri, his 
March 14 partner Mohammed Safadi, former PM Najib Mikati and 
Omar Karame,  If this succeeded, March 14 would lose four of 
its current eight seats in Tripoli.  The same day, deputy SYG 
 
BEIRUT 00000139  003 OF 003 
 
 
of the Islamic party Jemaah Islamiya (not currently 
represented in the government) announced an initial agreementwith the Future Movement to partner in the electios.  In 
addition, the announcement named six of its members running 
in the parliamentary elections for Sunni seats in Beirut, 
Tripoli, Dannieh, Sidon, and West Bekaa districts. 
Privately, Hariri advisor Ghattas Khoury told us Hariri would 
likely offer Jemaah Islamiya one seat on his candidate list, 
either in Beirut or in Akkar, a district in north Lebanon. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (C) We have consistently heard that Michel Murr would 
align with March 14 for the election, but Khoja's comments 
that Murr would be able to bring his political partner, the 
Armenian Tashnaq party, to the March 14 fold contradicts our 
other sources.  Armenian Tashnaq MP Hagop Pakradunian 
continues to say Tashnaq will support Murr himself for 
election no matter where Murr positions himself, but 
otherwise the party plans to support candidates of opposition 
Christian leader Michel Aoun.  Also, Saad Hariri has so far 
rejected Tashnaq's overtures, saying he does not trust the 
party to stay loyal to March 14.  However, we would not rule 
out the possibility that Khoja's confidence about Michel Murr 
and Tashnaq reflects that there is a Saudi-financed payoff in 
the works.  The Ambassador will follow up on these themes in 
meetings with Murr and Pakradunian, and the DCM with Aounist 
MP Ibrahim Kanaan, this week. 
 
12. (C) Saad Hariri's reported desire to become Prime 
Minister even in an opposition-led government -- if true -- 
would be troubling.  Although some Sunni interlocutors would 
view it as only right that Lebanon's most prominent Sunni 
take the Sunni PM office, no matter which side won, we assess 
that such a move under this scenario could damage March 14's 
credibility and strength for future elections.  It would also 
allow a new government dominated by the current opposition to 
let Hariri take the blame for mistakes or unpopular 
decisions, weakening his stature.  End comment. 
 
SISON