وزير درزي معارض: على الولايات المتحدة أن تكون شريكاً متوازناً للبنان والمنطقة

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO 
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, WARLICK 
P FOR HMUSTAFA, RRANGASWAMY 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2018 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, UNSC, MARR, MOPS, SY, LE 
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DRUZE (OPPOSITION) MINISTER: U.S. SHOULD 
BE BALANCED PARTNER FOR LEBANON, REGION 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 1201 
     B. BEIRUT 739 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) An affable Minister of Youth and Sports Talal Arslan 
welcomed the recent Damascus meeting between Presidents 
Sleiman and Asad as a positive step in putting the 
Lebanese-Syrian bilateral relationship back on a good track. 
Thanking the U.S. for its military assistance, Arslan said 
the list of possible candidates for the army commander had 
been narrowed to two, although President Sleiman preferred to 
submit to the cabinet only one name to avoid splitting the 
army.  Arslan called for an expanded National Dialogue, and 
bemoaned the influence of regional actors and confessional 
strife in undermining Lebanon's democratic system.  Arslan 
attributed improved relations with Druze rival Walid Jumblatt 
as a necessary step to safeguarding Lebanon's Druze minority. 
 End summary. 
 
VISIT MEETS EXPECTATIONS, 
FOR THE MOST PART 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Charge Grant, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and Senior 
LES Political Advisor, met with Druze Minister of Youth and 
Sports and leader of the Lebanese Democratic Party Talal 
Arslan at his home in Khalde on August 18.  Marwan Abu Fadel 
(Senior Advisor and de facto translator for the meeting), 
Ziad Choueiri, Vice President of the party, and Salim 
Hamadeh, Foreign Affairs advisor, and his secretary attended 
on Arslan's side. 
 
PRAISE FOR DAMASCUS MEETING 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Arslan described the atmosphere in the new cabinet as 
excellent, with all parties making an effort to "turn the 
page."  Noting that President Sleiman had briefed the cabinet 
on August 15, following his trip to Damascus (Ref A) Arslan 
lauded the summit as positive, especially after three years 
of tension with Syria.  Lebanon cannot afford to be totally 
against Syria, he said, for social more than political 
reasons.  There are still strong family connections between 
the two countries, including the Druze communities, he 
explained.  Furthermore, Arslan believed Sleiman could 
succeed in mending the bilateral relationship because of the 
mutual confidence generated during his nine years (n.b., six 
under Syrian occupation) as Commander of the Lebanese Armed 
Forces.  We need confidence-building, he said, and Sleiman is 
the man to do this. 
 
4. (C) On diplomatic relations, Arslan confirmed that on 
August 21 Lebanon and Syria would issue simultaneous decrees 
to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level 
(provided, he added, that Lebanon did not reject Syria's 
overture, as he claimed it did in 1962).  He expected that 
some points of the bilateral treaties between Syria and 
Lebanon would be revised, adding that the cabinet had decided 
to distribute the entire package of treaties only for 
comment.  The Higher Syrian-Lebanese Council was not included 
in the package, he said, implying that there was no proposal 
to disband the Council following the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. 
 
5. (C)  On detainees, Arslan said a committee within the 
Ministry of Justice would follow up.  On borders, he said 
President Sleiman himself had decided to take responsibility 
for both control and "delimitation" of the borders, 
explaining that Sleiman wanted to reserve all delicate 
security matters for himself.  (Note:  The Ministries of 
Defense and Interior are the two key players here; both 
Ministers are Sleiman appointees.  End note.)  All other 
issues would be referred to their respective ministries. 
 
LAF COMMANDER: 
 
BEIRUT 00001220  002 OF 003 
 
 
DOWN TO TWO NAMES? 
------------------ 
 
6. (C) Arslan reported that two names were still being 
considered for Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, 
Georges Khoury and Jean Kawaji, and that it was possible both 
would be sent to the cabinet for a vote.  However, President 
Sleiman preferred to nominate to the cabinet just one 
candidate, to avoid splitting the army.  Arslan agreed with 
this approach, stressing the need to keep the army, as the 
only strong state institution, strong.  Arslan also took the 
opportunity to thank the U.S. for its military assistance. 
 
SEEKING A SEAT AT 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE TABLE 
----------------------- 
 
7. (C) On the National Dialogue, Arslan argued for a seat at 
the table, adding that without the participation of 
additional figures from the opposition, (Marada leader) 
Suleiman Franjieh, Sunni opposition leader Omar Karame, and 
himself, it would be an "amputated dialogue."  Lebanon's is a 
consensual democracy, he said, whereby no one can impose its 
will on the other, and the majority cannot rule without the 
minority.  Noting that this principle was enshrined in the 
preamble of the constitution, Arslan dubbed it a weak point 
in Lebanon's democratic system, because it ruled out the 
possibility of checks and balances. 
 
8. (C) Furthermore, Lebanon was not a real democracy because 
the highest position a Druze could reach was minister, he 
complained.  (Note:  In addition to some Druze ministers in 
the cabinet, the acting LAF Commander, General al-Masri, is a 
Druze.  However, under Lebanon's confessional based system 
for filling important government positions, the LAF Commander 
position is reserved for a Maronite Christian.  End note.) 
Arslan advocated using proportional representation as the 
best way to ensure that all of Lebanon's parties were 
represented in the political system. 
 
REGIONAL INFLUENCE, 
CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM 
AT HEART OF LEBANON'S WOES 
-------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Turning to Lebanese-U.S. relations, Arslan stressed 
that "no one in Lebanon does not want" good relations, 
because everyone recognizes that the U.S. can be a "fair" 
partner in the region and help promote regional stability. 
However, he complained that in the past the U.S. had only 
opened up to the March 14 majority.  Now a real, effective 
U.S. role was needed to save the country. 
 
10. (C) Arslan explained that because of Lebanon's weak 
political system, it was influenced by all the regional 
players, which discouraged Lebanese from taking real stands 
on issues.  This is why we always say we will be the last 
ones to sign a peace treaty with Israel, he said, because we 
would not dare risk the criticism of our Arab partners for 
acting before them.  Citing the recent violence in Tripoli 
(which he appeared to attribute to Salafists), Arslan said 
this was an example of foreign issues being transferred to 
Lebanon.  The Salafists are hidden in a cocoon, he said, and 
no one can stop them, because their decisions are not made 
here. 
 
11. (C) Furthermore, Lebanon was the political and security 
hostage of its own confessional system, he said.  The August 
18 agreement between some of the Salafists and Hizballah was 
an effort to avoid a Sunni-Shia conflict, he said.  Hizballah 
is obsessed with avoiding such a conflict, which would be not 
only a local but a regional disaster, he added.  Relaying 
that he had met with Saudi Ambassador Khoja the previous 
week, Arslan said the Saudis shared this concern out of fear 
of Iran, and majority leader Saad Hariri did not have the 
freedom to act against the Saudis.  There are no Salafists in 
Syria, Arslan commented, adding dryly that 
perhaps the Syrians knew what they were doing during the 1978 
Hama massacre. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00001220  003 OF 003 
 
 
DRUZE CIRCLE 
THE WAGONS 
------------ 
 
12. (C) Arslan confirmed that his relationship with Druze 
rival Walid Jumblatt had improved following the May conflict 
and Doha agreement.  He claimed they did not discuss 
politics, adding that he respected Jumblatt's Druze "niche," 
and could not predict the implications of this new 
cooperation for the 2009 legislative elections. 
 
13. (C)  Criticizing Jumblatt for adopting too harsh a tone 
toward Syria in recent statements, Arslan said even Jumblatt 
admitted he went too far.  The most important thing is to 
protect the Druze communities, he said; the Druze cannot be 
the front line for Lebanon's problems.  Unfortunately, deals 
happened at the expense of Lebanon's minorities, which is why 
historically all of Lebanon's various confessional groups 
except the Druze have sought regional protection.  The 
Christians already know this, he said, noting that Christians 
and Druze made up the bulk of Lebanese emigration and, unlike 
the Shia, are unlikely to return.  Over 30 percent of 
Lebanese Druze now live outside of Lebanon, he said. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14. (C) An affable contact, Arslan did not camouflage his 
affinity for Syria (where he travels frequently) but at the 
same time was openly warm towards the U.S. (where he attended 
George Washington University) and American democracy. 
Surrounded by cameras and advisors, he seemed pleased to be 
back in the spotlight.  Jumblatt ally and Druze Minister Wael 
Abu Four had told us Arslan was "an idiot".  While we would 
not go that far, he certainly is not a nuanced thinker like 
rival Jumblatt (though perhaps not as prone to mood swings 
either). 
GRANT