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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR I/O PDAS WARLICK 
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY 
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EFIN, LE, SY 
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN SETTING THE STAGE TO CHALLENGE 
ELECTION RESULTS? 
 
REF: 08 BEIRUT 1682 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) In a January 28 meeting with the Ambassador, Free 
Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun complained that 
Sunni Future Movement leader Saad Hariri planned to pay to 
fly in expatriate Christian voters to vote against Aoun in 
the June parliamentary elections.  Aoun dismissed the idea 
that an independent or centrist political bloc could be a 
positive force in Lebanese politics.  He believed an 
electoral arrangement between himself and the Murr family 
might be possible for the elections, particularly given his 
historical links to Defense Minister Elias Murr.  He 
described his progress in developing electoral lists in 
concert with his coalition partners, including Hizballah. 
 
2. (C) Aoun criticized March 14 for not doing enough to 
prevent the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, and outlined once again the thinking behind his 
national defense strategy.  He described the Arab Peace 
initiative as "suspended, not dead."  He was unsure why Syria 
had not yet appointed an ambassador to Lebanon.  He described 
coordination between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) was excellent.  End summary. 
 
COUNTERING HARIRI'S PLOY 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) On January 28, the Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ 
Chief and EconOff, called on FPM leader Michel Aoun at his 
home in Rabieh.  Aoun voiced concerns about security during 
the upcoming parliamentary elections on June 7.  He  assessed 
that there would not be enough civil service and security 
personnel to carry out the elections in one day, and wondered 
why the majority had pushed so hard for one-day elections 
without the resources to carry them out.  He professed to be 
more worried, however, about reports that Future Movement 
leader Saad Hariri was planning to use his significant 
resources to fly in not only fellow Sunnis, but also 
Christians, to vote against Aoun and his allies in the 
elections.  He lamented that he did not have funds to fly in 
his own expatriate supporters, and said that despite rumors 
to the contrary, he was receiving no outside funding from 
Iran for such tactics.  He complained that the majority had 
purposely pushed off the decision to allow Lebanese 
expatriates to vote in their countries of residence until it 
was too late to put the systems in place to support overseas 
voting. 
 
4. (C) Aoun highlighted the ambitious legislative agenda he 
had introduced to parliament as one way he might counter 
Hariri's tactics.  Of the five laws he has submitted, so far 
only one had been passed, granting the payment of arrears to 
government employees and increasing salaries in certain 
government sectors.  Four others, on pension plans for the 
elderly, social security, restrictions on foreign ownership 
of property, and lowering the gas excise tax, await a vote, 
and Aoun said he would personally lead the parliamentary 
debate on these topics.  He hoped his attempt to secure 
improvements on these issues of social importance would 
attract support, and by getting the word out on the FPM 
website and on television, perhaps convince some overseas 
voters to stay home rather than accept Hariri's offer to fly 
to Lebanon and vote against him. 
 
INDEPENDENTS: 
"I AM NOT SURE WHAT THEY ARE" 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Aoun rejected the idea of "independent" or "centrist" 
candidates creating a viable political bloc in Lebanon.  He 
called the concept of "centrist" indefinable, and said that 
in the current political atmosphere, politicians needed to 
choose a clear path.  He pointed out that some "independents" 
 
BEIRUT 00000124  002 OF 004 
 
 
were funded by March 14, and claimed that by calling 
themselves independents, candidates were trying to destroy 
political forces, rather than working with them as a positive 
force for change.  He noted that he had many disagreements 
with Hizballah, but assessed that his 2006 memorandum of 
understanding with it had led to its restraint in the recent 
Gaza conflict. 
 
6. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked Aoun how he would define 
President Michel Sleiman in the context of Aoun's rejection 
of "centrists."  Aoun replied that Sleiman had been elected 
as a consensus candidate, and was forced to govern as such. 
This means, said Aoun, that Sleiman does not have much room 
for maneuver and will work "only within the legal limits of 
his position." 
 
ARRANGEMENT WITH MURR? 
---------------------- 
 
7. (C) Aoun said that despite a "rather negative" 
relationship with independent Christian leader Michel Murr, 
he believed he might be able to come to some sort of limited 
agreement with the Murr family on parliamentary seats in the 
heavily Christian Metn district.  He based this belief on a 
special bond he said he had formed with Murr's son Elias, the 
current Defense Minister, when, according to Aoun, he "saved 
Elias from being executed by Samir Geagea."  (Note:  Elias 
Murr was reportedly with Lebanese Forces leader Elie Hobeika 
in 1986, when LF rival Geagea sent fighters against Hobeika 
for participating in tripartite talks in Damascus with the 
Amal militia and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.  Aoun sent 
troops in to assist Hobeika and Murr.  End note.)  As a 
result, said Aoun, "we cannot be enemies."  While he stressed 
any accord would be very limited in scope, Aoun believed he 
could come to an agreement with Elias Murr. 
 
8. (C) Aoun said he was working with Hizballah and his March 
8 partners in determining candidate lists.  Although he said 
he and Hizballah do not overlap in many districts in Lebanon, 
he noted hat they had made some decisions on who would 
chose candidates in the areas where their candidates might 
conflict, such as Baabda.  He said his lists across Lebanon, 
which will be predominantly Christian, would likely include a 
total of three Shia, one Sunni, and one Druze, who, if 
elected, might not sit in his parliamentary group once 
parliament convened, but would support his initiatives on the 
national level. 
 
TAWTEEN 
------- 
 
9. (C) Aoun criticized the March 14 majority for not doing 
enough to prevent the permanent resettlement of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon (tawteen).  He said March 14 's proposal 
to require parliamentary unanimity (vice the usual two-thirds 
majority) to amend the constitutional preamble prohibiting 
tawteen would do nothing to prevent the permanent 
resettlement of the Palestinians, unless the GOL engaged with 
the international actors who will determine the fate of 
Palestinians' right of return to Israel.  He claimed that 
although Lebanon is a country of massive emigration, the 
countries that host Lebanese across the world have physical 
space and sufficient population to absorb them, while Lebanon 
cannot absorb 400,000 Palestinians.  (Comment:  Aoun appears 
to have changed tack following the majority's clear position 
against tawteen; whereas before he accused March 14 of 
supporting tawteen, he now argues it is not doing enough to 
prevent external forces from imposing permanent resettlement 
on Lebanon.  End comment.) 
 
10. (C) Aoun touched briefly on the recent regional debate 
over whether the Arab Peace Initiative could still move 
forward or should be scrapped.  He noted that the initiative 
had been suspended since its initial presentation, because 
the Israelis had not officially responded to the offer, 
though they had indeed leaned toward rejecting it.  He 
pointed to President Sleiman's defense of the initiative in 
the face of Arab voices calling for its withdrawal, and said 
that though the initiative might look dead, "in politics, any 
 
BEIRUT 00000124  003 OF 004 
 
 
death can be resuscitated." 
 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE: 
DEFENSE STRATEGIES 
------------------ 
 
10. (C) Aoun noted that since he had presented his national 
defense strategy at the National Dialogue session in November 
(reftel), Samir Geagea and Boutros Harb had presented 
alternative visions of the strategy.  He said his strategy 
starts from a very different principle from the others': 
while they base their strategies on the idea of 
demobilization of Hizballah into a national army (the LAF), 
his starts with the idea of the national resistance.  He 
stressed once again that any external threat to Lebanon, 
because of the country's size and geography, would require 
guerrilla tactics in order to defeat it, something the LAF is 
not prepared to use.  He reiterated his vision that the LAF 
should be used to counter internal threats. 
 
11. (C) The Ambassador asked Aoun how he viewed the level of 
coordination between the LAF and UNIFIL forces in southern 
Lebanon.  Aoun responded that coordination was excellent, and 
that UNIFIL served as "moral authority" to the LAF in its 
operations south of the Litani River.  He said Hizballah had 
told him it fully accepts the UNIFIL presence. 
 
WHERE IS THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR? 
------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Noting that Defense Minister Elias Murr was in Syria 
on an official visit, Aoun had no information on why the 
Syrian government has not yet appointed an ambassador to 
Lebanon.  He said his impression during his December visit to 
Syria was that relations between the two countries were back 
on track, and he was perplexed as to why the Syrian 
ambassador had not yet arrived.  He assessed that the Syrians 
often speak using "the language of silence," though he said 
he was not aware of what the Syrians might be wanting or 
expecting before making the appointment.  He believed 
President Sleiman might be in a better position to know, and 
acknowledged that Syria's acceptance of Lebanon's 
ambassadorial appointment to Damascus, Michel Khoury, was a 
good sign. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (C) Already we see signs that Aoun is setting the stage 
to challenge the electoral results should they not go in his 
favor.  (Note:  To this day, he challenges 11 seats from the 
2005 elections.  End note.)  His "concerns" about security 
and the majority's financing and facilitation of expatriates' 
return to Lebanon to vote belie the fact that the opposition 
has its own much better financed and organized electoral 
machine, not to mention media.  Furthermore, we doubt Aoun's 
claim that he himself does not benefit from external 
financing. 
 
14. (C) We will continue to watch the Murr/Aoun/Tashnaq 
relationship closely.  While independent MP Michel Murr (whom 
the Ambassador will see on February 2), continues to assert 
that he will not/not ally with Aoun, there is rampant 
speculation that his son Elias is still undecided.  At a 
dinner we attended hosted by Saad's advisor Ghattas Khoury, 
and also attended by Druze MPs Walid Jumblatt, Marwan 
Hamadeh, Wael Abu Four, and National Liberal Party chief Dory 
Chamoun, the March 14 contacts suggested that Elias' January 
28 trip to Damascus, during which, to no one's surprise, he 
had an unscheduled meeting with Syrian President Bashar Asad, 
would impact Elias' decision. 
 
15. (C) Finally, we have heard from several sources that the 
opposition, like March 14, also is facing internal squabbling 
over candidate selection, Aoun's assertions to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  In Christian districts like Jezzine, for 
example, we have been told that Aoun is not happy with 
Hizballah's insistence on calling the shots.  The much more 
disciplined opposition, however, is less likely to air its 
 
BEIRUT 00000124  004 OF 004 
 
 
dirty laundry publicly in order to present a unified front, a 
lesson the majority could learn from.  End comment. 
 
SISON