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سعد الحريري يريد رحيل لحود

برقية من السفارة الأميركية في بيروت رقم 06BEIRUT2602، آب 2006، بتصنيف Confidential,Noforn. النص الأصلي بالإنكليزية.

المصدر: نُشرت أصلاً على موقع ويكيليكس (برقيات كيبلغيت، 2010 و2011). النص كما هو. · النشر الأصلي

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002602 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2026 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PTER, LE, SY, IS 
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WANTS LAHOUD OUT 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4(d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1.  (C/NF)  In a meeting with Ambassador Feltman and poloff 
(notetaker) on August 12 at his Qoreitem mansion, Future 
Movement leader Saad Hariri spoke about his key objectives in 
the aftermath of a ceasefire between Israel and Hizballah. 
Convinced at the time of the meeting that the Lebanese 
Cabinet will unanimously accept UNSCR 1701 during its session 
at 1700 local time on August 12, Hariri warned that the 
international community must continue to keep Syria and Iran 
off balance.  In conjunction with this, he intends to push 
anew for the ouster of President Emile Lahoud and senior 
Lebanese army officials, including LAF chief Michel Sleiman. 
He predicts that Hizballah will be militarily and politically 
weakened by this conflict, and that Nabih Berri will 
capitalize on this in reasserting his Amal party as the 
preeminent Shi'ite grouping in Lebanon.  The reconstruction 
effort will be a key factor in deciding whether the central 
government, with international backing, will be able to 
strengthen its influence in the South or whether the vacuum 
will be filled once again by Iranian money channelled through 
Hizballah, not the government.  Asked about putting a 
mechanism in place to control arms smuggling, Saad appeared 
uninformed and unconcerned by the specifics and suggested 
that everything comes down to keeping the Syrians and 
Iranians otherwise occupied.  End Summary. 
 
EXPECTS RESOLUTION WILL BE APPROVED 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  When asked whether the Cabinet will approve UNSCR 
1701 during this afternoon's session, Saad said confidently 
that, "it will go through."  During a side conversation with 
Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi before the Hariri 
meeting, Aridi told the Ambassador that there will be "no 
problem" in gaining unanimous Cabinet approval of the 
resolution, adding that Nabih Berri has played a particularly 
important role in gaining Hizballah acquiescence. (Note. 
This was before Iranian FM Mottaki's speech in Yemen calling 
the resolution unacceptable.  Also, the ongoing Israeli 
military actions -- that intensified today rather than 
lessened, as most Lebanese expected -- have provoked some 
Lebanese into calling the resolution clearly one-sided.  End 
Note.) 
 
POST CEASEFIRE 
-------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Looking ahead to the period following the hoped-for 
LAF/UNIFIL-plus deployment and Israeli/Hizballah withdrawal, 
Hariri hopes to weaken Syrian and Iranian influence in 
Lebanon while strenghtening the central government as much as 
possible.  He believes that Hizballah, though it will claim 
victory, has in fact "been hurt big time" and  will emerge 
from this conflict significantly weaker both militarily and 
politically.  According to Hariri, "Nabih Berri is furious 
with Hizballah."  While Berri will maintain a united Shi'a 
front for some months following the conflict, Berri will put 
pressure on Hizballah to keep in line and, ultimately, 
"Berri's dream is to finish off Hizballah" and reclaim Amal's 
primacy among the Shi'a.  Hariri said that Berri had 
compelled Hizballah to accept the LAF deployment plan, and 
that this spells "the beginning of the end" for HIzballah. 
"If we play our cards right," Hariri added. 
 
4.  (C/NF)  Hariri stressed that Berri should be strengthened 
by ensuring a successful LAF deployment to the South and by 
channelling international assistance for reconstruction 
through mechanisms in which Berri has a role.  Mentioning 
specifically Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates, Hariri asked that the USG help "entice people" to 
donate funds and military equipment to the government.  He 
said he had spoken to Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohamed Bin 
Zayed, who is "willing to come in big time."  He also 
suggested setting up a Lebanon donors' conference along the 
lines of last year's "Beirut One" conference.  Hariri added 
that if Iran wishes to contribute, it can do so through the 
central government and not simply through Hizballah as it has 
 
BEIRUT 00002602  002 OF 002 
 
 
done in the past.  (Note.  Ghazi Aridi, with whom the 
Ambassador spoke briefly while at Hariri's house, also 
mentioned establishing an "Arab and International Fund for 
Lebanon," managed by the GOL and specifically Berri, to which 
countries could donate.  "Iran couldn't refuse to put money 
in this fund."  End note.)  The Ambassador raised with Hariri 
the concern that the Berri family, and Berri's wife Randa in 
particular, should not be able to benefit financially, as 
they have with previous development funding for the south. 
 
5.  (C)  On support for the LAF deployment, Hariri said that 
the French are preparing to take the lead and will send a 
contingent for UNIFIL-plus and have reached out to the Turks, 
Malaysians, and Spanish.  Cryptically, Hariri added that "we 
need the Russians too."  When queried as to why a Russian 
contingent to UNIFIL-plus is so critical, Hariri waved the 
matter off. 
 
6.  (C/NF)  Asking that his comments be kept close-hold, 
Hariri whispered that, "We need to remove Lahoud, (LAF 
commander Michel) Sleiman, and (Head of the G2 army 
intelligence) George Khoury.  They are in bed with Syria. 
They are in bed with Hizballah."  While Hariri hopes to 
eventually recruit Nabih Berri's critical support to achieve 
this, he asked that international pressure on Iran and Syria 
continue unabated.  "We need to keep Iran and Syria busy with 
themselves."  On Iran, he urged that we secure a tough new 
Security Council resolution on the nuclear program in early 
September.  On Syria, he pressed for the quick establishment 
of an international tribunal to try those suspected in his 
father's assassination.  He said that if the Security Council 
were to pass the resolution on the tribunal now, the Cabinet 
would be able to accept it and forward it for parliamentary 
approval.  Hariri wants to "have a sword on Iran's neck and 
on Syria's neck" in order to weaken their Lebanese proxies. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C/NF)  While focusing on the long term, Hariri brushed 
off some key concerns.  Asked about controlling arms 
smuggling, he professed surprise that Beirut International 
Airport might still be used for such a nefarious purpose and 
thought that Hizballah no longer controlled the airport. 
Regarding his plan for a Berri-led development effort, Hariri 
minimized concerns about the Speaker's history of siphoning 
off funds from his post-civil war Council for the South, 
saying that it had only been "10 to 15 per cent" and that, 
despite this, Berri "succeeded" in building up the South. 
 
8.  (C/NF)  Hariri desperately wants to be rid of Lahoud and 
Sleiman in particular, and is relying on international 
pressure on their patrons Syria and Iran.  However, Hariri 
said he has no idea of who should replace Lahoud and Sleiman. 
 Acknowledging that the Sunna and Shi'a can not simply choose 
the replacements without consulting the Maronites, from whose 
ranks the President and LAF chief should come, Hariri 
suggested that "our Maronite friends" do not yet have their 
house sufficiently in order to agree on successors to the 
posts. 
 
9.  (C/NF)  On a positive note, Hariri praised with seeming 
sincerity the performance of PM Fouad Siniora during this 
crisis.  "If I had picked Bahije (Tabbarah, former Minister 
of Justice) a year ago," he said, his voice trailing off as 
he shook his head.  We think that this was a tacit 
acknowledgement, Saad-style, that the strong advice we and 
the French gave him to pick Siniora over his initial choice 
of Tabbarah was the right one.  But what was encouraging in 
Saad's praise for Siniora was the suggestion that the two of 
them will now be able to cooperate without the internal 
rivalries and jealousies that had plagued their relationship 
earlier this year.  In general, we think Siniora has done a 
better job when he hasn't had to worry about the less 
experienced but politicaly more powerful Saad second-guessing 
him.  But we also believe that it's good Saad is home:  the 
image of Saad Hariri staying at the Plaza Athenee in Paris 
and globe-trotting with an sizable entourage, while hundreds 
of thousands of Lebanese felt forced to leave their homes, 
was not good for the future of the March 14 movement. 
FELTMAN 

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